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The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms
Robert A. Mikos*
ABSTRACT

The states have launched a revolution in marijuana policy, creating a wide
gap between state and federal marijuana law. While nearly every state has
legalized marijuana in at least some circumstances, federal law continues to
ban the substance outright. Nonetheless, the federal response to state reforms
has been anything but static during this revolution. This Essay, based on my
Distinguished Speaker Lecture at Delaware Law School, examines how the
federal response to state marijuana reforms has evolved over time, from War,
to Partial Truce, and, next (possibly) to Capitulation. It also illuminates the
ways in which this shifting federal response has alternately constrained and
liberated states as they seek to regulate marijuana as they deem fit.

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. This Essay is based on my
Distinguished Speaker Keynote Lecture for the Cannabis in the Tri-State Area Symposium at

Delaware Law School in March of 2019. I thank Professor Luke Scheuer and the editors and
staff of the Widener Law Review for organizing and hosting the Symposium.
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We are experiencing nothing short of a revolution in marijuana law. Just
twenty-three years ago, every state in the Union banned marijuana outright.'
Today, by contrast, only one state still does (Idaho). 2 Put another way, over
the last two decades, forty-nine states plus the District of Columbia have
legalized the use of marijuana for at least some purposes.3
Figure 1 illuminates the steady spread of these state marijuana reforms
over time. The stacked bars show the total number of states that have
legalized marijuana by the end of each year from 1996-2018.
FIGURE 1: STATES LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 4
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The earliest reforms, like California's Compassionate Use Act (aka
Proposition 215), legalized only medical use of the drug (at least in name).5
The gray portion of each stacked bar represents the share of states that
legalized medical-and only medical-marijuana, at the end of each year
depicted in Figure 1. The white portion of the stacked bar represents the
share of states that adopted a very narrow version of a medical marijuana
law. Starting with Alabama in 2014, states began legalizing medical use of
marijuana,
but
only
when the
drug
contained
very little
Tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC"), the psychoactive chemical (cannabinoid)
produced by the cannabis plant.6 I label these "CBD Only" states because

1 ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY 3 (2017)
MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW].

A. Mikos, Only One State Has Not Yet Legalized Marijuana in Some Form ...
LAW,
POLICY,
AND
AUTHORITY
BLOG
(June
16,
2018),
,

2 Robert

[hereinafter

MARIJUANA

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/20 1 8/07/only-one-state-has-not-yet-legalizedmarijuana-in-some-form/ [hereinafter Mikos, Only One State].
3
Id.
4

Figure 1 is updated and adapted from Figure 1.1 in MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supranote
1, at 3.
5
Id. at 99.
6
1 d at 123.
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they are interested in enabling access to another cannabinoid with reputed
therapeutic benefits: cannabidiol ("CBD").'
Although CBD is not
psychoactive, it is (or was, until very recently) nearly always considered
"marijuana" in the eyes of the law.' But because these "CBD Only" laws are
much narrower than the medical marijuana reforms depicted in gray, I have
shown them separately in Figure 1.
In 2012, some states that previously adopted medical marijuana laws
began to legalize the drug for non-medical purposes as well.' 0 The black
portion of the stacked bar in Figure 1 depicts the spread of these
"Recreational and Medical" reforms. In a nutshell, states with "Recreational
and Medical" marijuana laws permit anyone over twenty-one years of age to
possess and use marijuana, regardless of their reasons for so doing; and
nearly all of these states also permit commercial vendors to sell the drug to
lawful consumers."
The last stacked bar at the far-right side of Figure 1 shows how far these
three types of marijuana reform have proliferated across the states. At the
end of 2018, ten states (plus the District of Columbia) had legalized adult use
of marijuana ("Recreational and Medical"); another thirty-nine states had
legalized marijuana exclusively for medical purposes, with twenty-three of
those states allowing marijuana with THC ("Medical Only") and another
sixteen states allowing marijuana without THC ("CBD Only").12
By itself, this dramatic transformation in state marijuana laws is quite
remarkable. But the transformation is even more remarkable in light of the
fact that it has taken place in the shadow of a strict federal ban on the drug.
Since 1970-well before California launched the modern reform
movement-federal law has banned the possession, manufacture, and
distribution of marijuana, making no exception for medical (or other) use of
the drug.' 3 In the ensuing half-century, the federal ban has survived
constitutional challenges, " as well as a groundswell in public support for
legalization of the drug.
7 MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 123.
'Robert A. Mikos, New CongressionalFarmBill Legalizes Some Marijuana,MARIJUANA
LAW,

POLICY,

AND

AUTHORITY

BLOG

(Dec.

13,

2018),

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/12/new-congressional-farm-bill-legalizessome-marijuana/ [hereinafter Mikos, New CongressionalFarm Bill].
9 For

a discussion of the differences between Medical Only and CBD Only laws, see

MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 123-124.
10
Id. at 3.
" Id. at 443; see also Robert A. Mikos, Some Observations on How Vermont Just
Legalized Recreational Marijuana,MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY BLOG. (Jan.
24, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/01/352/.
12 Mikos, Only One State, supra note 2.
13 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2016).

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding application of the federal marijuana
ban to the intra-state possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana).
14

15

E.g., Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Now Support Legalizing Marijuana,

GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/po11/243908/two-three-americans-support-
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The tension between the federal marijuana ban and state reforms is one of
the primary reasons why marijuana law has become such a hot field and the
subject of symposia. The attention that the field is now attracting is
warranted; in part because of the tension between state and federal law, the
field raises some of the most fascinating and important legal issues of our
day.16
To set the stage for our discussion on some of these issues, this essay
discusses in more detail how the federal government has responded to state
reforms. As I will show, the federal response has wielded a substantial and
sometimes overlooked influence on the design of state marijuana laws.
Furthermore, that influence has not been fixed across time. It is important to
recognize that the federal response to state reforms has evolved over the past
two decades, even though the federal law governing marijuana has remained
largely the same. For the first decade (or so) of state reforms, the federal
government took an overtly hostile and aggressive approach to marijuana
legalization in the states." Among other things, it threatened to punish
growers who distributed marijuana and physicians who recommended the
drug to state-authorized patients. To defuse these threats, the states had to
come up with creative solutions, which are evident in some otherwise
puzzling features of state reforms (a few of which I will discuss in a moment).
But starting in 2009, the federal government began to adopt a far more
tolerant approach toward legalization.'
In particular, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), for the most part, stopped enforcing the federal marijuana
ban against individuals who were acting in compliance with state law. This
shift in federal response enabled states to pursue even broader reforms and
to adopt more robust regulations of marijuana. Nonetheless, the ongoing
tension between state and federal law continues to pose some unique
challenges for the marijuana industry and for state officials tasked with
regulating them. I will conclude by offering some thoughts on what it would
take to remove these lingering challenges, should the federal government
decide to change its marijuana policy once again.

legalizing-marijuana.aspx (reporting that 66% of Americans support legalizing marijuana as
of 2018, compared to only 12% in 1970). For explanations of why these changes in public
opinion have not yet triggered changes to federal marijuana law, see Robert A. Mikos, Medical
Marjuana and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 UNIV. DENVER L. REV. 997-98
(2012) (identifying features of the national political process that help to preserve the federal
marijuana ban against "increasingly loud calls for reform"); David S. Schwartz, Presidential
Politics as a Safeguard ofFederalism:The Case ofMarifuanaLegalization, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
599 (2014) (giving another view of the impact of the federal political process on federal
marijuana law).
16 See MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 3-16 (identifying some key questions
posed by marijuana law and policy).
17 See infra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
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THE FIRST PHASE: WAR

)

The first federal response to state reforms was overtly hostile and
aggressive: call it "War." Not long after California adopted the nation's first
modern medical marijuana law in 1996, the federal drug czar at the time,
General Barry McCaffrey, urged federal agencies from the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") to the Department of Transportation
("DOT") to do their part to quash the nascent medical marijuana movement. 9
Many federal agencies heeded McCaffrey's call to arms. The DEA, for
example, raided a large number of dispensaries that had sprouted up to supply
medical marijuana to qualifying patients in legalization states.20 It also
threatened to bar physicians from writing prescriptions for any controlled
substance if they dared to prescribe marijuana to their patients. 2 1
Of course, this federal War did not actually stop states from legalizing the
drug. As you can see from Figure 1, the number of states legalizing medical
marijuana continued to grow steadily after 1996, notwithstanding this federal
hostility toward legalization.
(I explain elsewhere why the federal
government found it so difficult to stop this movement. 2 2
Nonetheless, the federal War on marijuana clearly influenced (likely for
the worse) how states designed their medical marijuana programs.2 3 In
particular, federal aggression made it more difficult for the states to regulate
marijuana as they deemed fit,2 4 leading the states to make some regulatory
choices that are otherwise quite difficult to explain or justify. Let me give
you two concrete examples to illustrate.
For one thing, the federal campaign against marijuana dispensaries likely
dissuaded many states from authorizing companies to supply the needs of
patients participating in state medical marijuana reforms. Notably, before
2003, no state had formally authorized companies to supply marijuana to
patients commercially.25 Instead, before 2003, every medical marijuana state
expected patients to grow their own marijuana or get it from a "caregiver"
who could grow it on their behalf (without remuneration). 26

19

Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215,

62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6166 (Feb. 11, 1997).
20 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States'
OverlookedPower to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1443 (2009) (noting

that the DEA raided "nearly 200 medical marijuana cooperatives in California alone" as part
of a plan to "disrupt essential components of state marijuana programs") [hereinafter Mikos,
On the Limits ofSupremacy].
21 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing DEA policy).
22 See Mikos, On the Limits ofSupremacy, supranote 20, at 1445-79 (detailing the dejure

and defacto limits on federal influence over marijuana policy).
23 See id. at 1428-30.
24 See id. at 1465-66.
25 See MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 532.
26

Id. at 413-42 (explaining the rules governing personal and caregiver cultivation).
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Figure 2 depicts the state-approved sources of supply from 1996-2018,
the same time period covered by Figure 1. In other words, Figure 2 shows
where qualifying patients could legally (under state law) obtain a drug they
were allowed (again, under state law) to possess and use. To simplify, Figure
2 includes only the "Medical Only" and "Medical and Recreational" states
from Figure 1.
FIGURE 2: MARIJUANA SUPPLY OPTIONS IN MEDICAL MARIJUANA
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The gray portion of each stacked bar in Figure 2 depicts the share of
medical marijuana states in each year that required patients (or their
caregivers) to grow the drug themselves but did not also (or instead) permit
commercial dispensaries to supply it to them. These states have adopted what
I call the "Personal Cultivation Only" supply model. The white portion of
the stacked bars depict the share of medical marijuana states that allowed
patients to buy the drug from commercial dispensaries. These states have
adopted what I call the "Commercial Cultivation Allowed" model.28
As you can see from Figure 2, there were very few medical marijuana
states that allowed dispensaries to produce and sell marijuana before 2009
(i.e., most of the stacked bar is still gray in those early years), and none that
did so explicitly before 2003. To be sure, there were some dispensaries
operating before 2009; however, those dispensaries were technically illegal
even under state law. 29 Hence, for more than the first decade of reform,
medical marijuana states depended almost exclusively on personal
27 MnOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 532 (Figure 2 is updated and adapted from
Figure 10.1 in the book).
28 Personal Cultivation and Commercial Cultivation are not mutually
exclusive; indeed,
several states allow both. For a more detailed breakdown of state models for the supply of
marijuana, see id. at 480, 532-33.
29
Id. at 532.
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cultivation to supply the needs of patients whom they believed might benefit
from the use of marijuana.3 0
In the abstract, expecting seriously ill patients to "grow their own"
medicine is an odd choice for the states to make. After all, no state says,
"you may use Percocet - and indeed, we think you might benefit from it, but
you'll have to make it yourself." In fact, states generally bar patients from
making their own controlled substances at home, even if they are allowed to
possess and use those same substances.3 1 But the federal government
arguably gave the states no choice but to opt for the Personal Cultivation
Only model. During this first phase, the federal government was threatening
to shut down commercial marijuana suppliers (especially large ones).32
Thus, while the states could have tried to set up a well-regulated medical
marijuana industry, they feared the effort would prove futile in the face of a
likely federal crackdown.33 Worse yet, states feared that a federal crackdown
on a state-regulated industry might leave patients without any source of
supply, especially if states required patients to buy the drug from licensed
vendors rather than grow their own.34
But states also recognized that the federal government's ability to enforce
its strict marijuana ban is limited, practically speaking. Even if it could shut
down large commercial suppliers in the handful of states that had (in those
early years) legalized medical marijuana, the federal government could not
realistically stop patients or their caregivers from producing the drug in small
batches. 35 There would simply be too many targets for federal law
enforcement agents to handle. Consider that a single state like Colorado has
over 100,000 registered medical marijuana patients, each of whom is allowed
to grow a small number of plants to supply their own needs. Thus, even
though personal cultivation has many shortcomings, the states may have
viewed it as the only viable way to supply the needs of medical marijuana
patients while the federal government waged war on commercial marijuana
dispensaries. 36
The aggressive federal response to state reforms also warped the way that
states structured the role of physicians in their medical marijuana programs.
Not surprisingly, medical marijuana states have wanted physicians to help
30
31
32

MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1 at 532.
Id. at 415.
See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 20, at 1443.

33 Indeed, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, licensing marijuana dispensaries may have
made those dispensaries even more vulnerable to a federal crackdown. Robert A. Mikos, Can

the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PENN. L. REv. 103 (2012)

(explaining that under the conventional wisdom, the federal government could seize any
information gathered by the a state through its licensing process and use that information to
identify and prosecute marijuana suppliers under federal law).
34 ROBERT A. MIKos, EXPERT REPORT IN ALLARD V. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF
CANADA 14-17 (Oct. 10, 2014).
35 See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 20, at 1463-69.
36 MIKos, EXPERT REPORT, supra note 34, at 14-17.
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them identify who should be allowed to use marijuana for medical
purposes.37 (In the 1990s and early 2000s, states were not yet ready to
legalize marijuana for non-medical purposes.) But recall that the DEA was
threatening to revoke the prescription-writing authority of physicians who
dared to prescribe marijuana to their patients.38
Thus, to entice physicians to perform this critical gatekeeping function,
states had to find a way to defuse the DEA sanctions. To that end, states like
California started to ask physicians to "recommend" rather than "prescribe"
marijuana to their patients.39 Such a recommendation entails telling a patient
that his/her medical condition might benefit from the use of marijuana.o Of
course, there appears to be little practical difference between prescribing
marijuana, on the one hand, and recommending the drug, on the other.
However, physicians convinced a prominent federal appeals court that the
two practices were legally distinguishable. In Conant v. Walters, the Ninth
Circuit held that merely "recommending" marijuana to a patient is First
Amendment protected speech, meaning that physicians could not be
punished for recommending marijuana to their patients, even though
physicians could be punished for prescribing it.4" The court reasoned
(dubiously) that a patient who receives a recommendation would not
necessarily use it to obtain marijuana; for example, the court suggested, that
"the patient upon receiving the recommendation could petition the
government to change the law." 42 By contrast, the court suggested that a
prescription served no purpose other than to enable a patient to obtain a drug;
writing a prescription for marijuana (a federally proscribed drug) would thus
aid and abet a patient's unlawful possession of marijuana, making it
unprotected crime-facilitating speech.43 Although the court's reasoning
regarding the actual function of a recommendation is questionable," the
37 See MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 601.
38 See supra, note 21, and accompanying text.
39
MIOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 110-11.
40 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.26423(q) (explaining that "'[wiritten

certification' means a document signed by a physician, stating all of the following: (1) The
patient's debilitating medical condition. (2) The physician has completed a full assessment of
the patient's medical history and current medical condition, including a relevant, in-person,
medical evaluation. (3) In the physician's professional opinion, the patientis likely to receive
therapeuticor palliative benefit from the medical use of marihuana to treat or alleviate the

patient's debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical
condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical condition."). The states
sometimes use different words to describe the "recommendation" (e.g., certification,
authorization, etc.), but the requirements are very similar across the states. For a further
discussion of the recommendation requirement, see MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supranote 1, at
110.
41 Conant, 309 F.3d at 632-33.
42
Id. at 634.
43
Id. at 633.
44 Nicole Santamaria, Note, Medical Marijuana Legislation in Florida: The
Recommendation vs. PrescriptionDistinctionfor Healthcare Providers, 45 STETSON L. REV.

537, 558 (2016) (suggesting that it is "willfully ignorant to say that a physician who
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DEA did not challenge the ruling and it has abided by the Conant court's
decision ever since. For this reason, all thirty-four medical marijuana states
(and D.C.) do not ask physicians to write prescriptions for marijuana, but
rather ask them only to recommend the drug to their patients.
Even though the states were able to work around this second federal
roadblock, asking physicians to issue "recommendations" in lieu of
"prescriptions" is less than ideal (just like asking patients to grow their own
marijuana is less than ideal). For one thing, although physicians are wellversed in the requirements for writing prescriptions, they are less familiar
with the novel requirements for issuing recommendations, and this
unfamiliarity may have needlessly exposed some patients to criminal
sanctions. In one early case, for example, a medical marijuana patient in
Washington state was prosecuted for possession of marijuana because the
words his physician recited in recommending marijuana for his condition
("the potential benefits of the medical use of marijuana may outweigh the
health risks") did not precisely match the magic words required by the state's
medical marijuana law ("the potential benefits of the medical use of
marijuana would likely outweigh the health risks") .4 In addition, states could
not use established prescription drug monitoring programs ("PDMPs") to
track medical marijuana recommendations.7 PDMPs are an enormously
valuable tool states use to combat prescription drug mills and abuse of
prescription drugs (like opioid painkillers).4 1 Thus, to monitor physician
recommendation practices and possible abuse of medical marijuana
programs, states had to create a parallel medical marijuana registration
process at an added cost to state budgets.
In sum, during this first phase of state reforms, the federal government
was overtly hostile to the legalization of marijuana. It waged war on
individuals - and especially suppliers - who sought to take advantage of the
states' newfound openness to medical marijuana. The federal hostility did
not stop reforms from spreading across the states; by the end of this period
(2008), twelve states and the District of Columbia had legalized medical

recommends medical marijuana to a patient does not intend that the patient will use that
recommendation as a means to obtain medical marijuana"); e.g, Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139
F. Supp. 2d 113, 120-21 (D.D.C. 2001) (reasoning that "a recommendation is analogous to a
prescription").
45 See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 20, at 1467 ("By carefully
circumscribing the task that physicians must perform, the states . . . prevented the federal
government from squeezing one of the most important chokepoints in state medical marijuana
programs.").
46 Washington v. Shepherd, 41 P.3d 1235 (Wash. App. 2002) (emphases added).
47
MIKOS, MARUIJANA LAW, supra note 1, at 625 n.6.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 116-18, 239-41 (discussing registration requirements).
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marijuana.'u It did, however, leave its mark on those reforms, by shaping
and warping the way that states regulated marijuana suppliers and physicians.
THE SECOND PHASE: A (PARTIAL) TRUCE

Following the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, the federal
government began to adopt a softer response toward state reforms. During
this Second Phase, the federal laws governing marijuana did not change
much (as I have already noted), but the way that the federal government
enforced those laws did change."' Most notably, in 2009, senior leadership
in the Department of Justice (DOJ) began to discourage United States
Attorneys from prosecuting individuals who used and/or supplied marijuana
in compliance with state marijuana reforms.52 In other words, senior DOJ
officials urged federal prosecutors to turn a blind eye to violations of the
federal marijuana ban.53
Even though this enforcement guidance conferred no legal rights on
marijuana users/suppliers," it still signaled that the federal government was
willing to call a "Truce" in its longstanding war on marijuana." (For reasons
I explain below, it might be more accurate to describe the federal response to
state reforms during this Second Phase as a "Partial Truce.") The federal
government has continued to abide by this "Partial Truce" even after the
change in Administrations. President Trump's first Attorney General, Jeff
Sessions, was adamantly opposed to marijuana legalization; Attorney
General Sessions even rescinded the Obama Administration enforcement
guidance. 6 Importantly, however, for reasons I have explained in greater
detail elsewhere, Sessions did not actually change federal enforcement
practices-and indeed, there was probably little he could have done, even if
he had desired to turn back the clock and reinstate the federal War on state
50

MIOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 3.

There has been only one notable substantive change to federal marijuana law since 1996.
The 2018 Farm Bill narrowed somewhat the definition of marijuana under federal law to
exclude cannabis plants that are low in THC. Those plants and any substances extracted
therefrom (like CBD) are now considered "hemp." For further discussion of the 2018 Farm
Bill, see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
51

52 See generally Robert A. Mikos, A CriticalAppraisal of the Department OfJustice's
New Approach to Medical Marijuana,22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 633 (2011) [hereinafter
Mikos, A Critical Appraisal].
53 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to all U.S. Att'ys (Aug. 29,
2013); see Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Selected U.S.
Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009).
54 See Mikos, A CriticalAppraisal, supra note 52, at 640-643. See also Zachary Price,
Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 937 (2017).

5 Professor Alex Kreit has helped to popularize the term "truce" to describe the federal
government's post (drug)-war drug policy. See Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OH. ST. L. J. 1323
(2016).
56

2018).

See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att'y Gen., to all U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 4,
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reforms." Among other reasons, since 2014, Congress has attached riders to
the DOJ's annual budget, barring the agency from using any of its funding to
prosecute individuals for possession, production, or distribution of marijuana
that complies with state medical marijuana reforms."
This Partial Truce, like the War it replaced, had a substantial effect on the
design of state marijuana reforms.
The states interpreted the DOT
enforcement guidance (and later, the congressional spending riders) as giving
them the green light to set up a legal, but highly regulated, commercial
marijuana industry. Thus, starting in 2009, an increasing share of medical
marijuana states authorized the commercial production and distribution of
marijuana 5 9-as shown by the growing white portion of the stacked bars in
Figure 2. In fact, by the end of 2018, each of the thirty-four medical
marijuana states (and D.C.) had authorized companies to produce and sell
medical marijuana.o In 2002, by contrast, none of the eight medical
marijuana states had allowed companies to grow and sell the drug, and even
by 2008, only three out of thirteen medical marijuana states had done so.
Starting around 2009, the states also adopted the first comprehensive
regulations to govern the newly-legalized marijuana industry. For example,
states began to restrict the packaging and labeling of marijuana products and
to impose onerous seed-to-sale tracking requirements on state-licensed
marijuana vendors.62 Today, roughly 5,000 companies are growing and

5 Robert A. Mikos, Jeff Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Enforcement Guidance: Five
Observations, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY BLOG (Jan. 5, 2018),

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/01/jeff-sessions-rescinds-obama-eraenforcement-guidance-six-observations/.
5' The latest rider provides that:
None of the funds made available under this Act to the Department of Justice may
be used, with respect to any of the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, or with respect to
the District of Columbia, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to prevent any of them from
implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT,

2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348, 444-

45 (Mar. 23, 2018). See also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016)

(interpreting rider language as barring the DOJ from prosecuting individuals for actions taken
in compliance with state medical marijuana laws).
59
MIOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 531-32; MIKos, EXPERT REPORT, supra note
34, at
14-17.
60
MIOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 532.
61
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MARIJUANA

COLO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, RETAIL

RULES

(AUG.

21, 2019, 3:22 PM), https://perma.cc/ARE5-UYD2.
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selling marijuana openly with the blessing of state government." None of
this would have been possible without the federal government's forbearance.
As I suggested earlier, however, this truce is only partial. Federal
agencies have not-and arguably could not-eliminate all of the restrictions
federal law now imposes on the marijuana industry simply by exercising their
enforcement discretion. I will briefly highlight three examples of how
federal law continues to bedevil the state-licensed marijuana industry,
notwithstanding the DOJ's refusal (or inability) to prosecute.
Difficulty in obtaining banking services is probably the most notable
obstacle federal law continues to impose on state licensed marijuana
suppliers. Banks remain reluctant to deal with state-licensed marijuana
suppliers, in large part, because it remains a federal crime to conduct
financial transactions involving the proceeds of unlawful activity (which
includes the sale of marijuana). 4 While the Department of the Treasury has
reassured banks that they will not be punished for doing business with the
marijuana industry, most banks want something more than the agency's nonbinding verbal reassurances that it is okay for them to break the law. In any
event, in return for its enforcement forbearance, Treasury has demanded that
banks monitor their marijuana clients closely and complete burdensome
reports on virtually all of their financial transactions, at enormous cost.6 ' For
these reasons, even state law-abiding marijuana suppliers currently have
difficulty obtaining even basic banking services, like checking accounts and
loans.
State licensed marijuana suppliers are currently also subject to an
unusually high effective federal tax rate. 6 All income is taxable, regardless
of its source. 7 Thus, like all other businesses, marijuana suppliers must pay
federal taxes on their income, even though their source of income is criminal
under federal law. Unlike most other businesses, however, marijuana
suppliers cannot deduct their usual operating expenses (e.g., expenditures on
legal services and marketing) from their revenues when calculating their
federal tax liability. A special provision of the Tax Code-Section 280Ebars illicit drug dealers (which, again, includes state-licensed marijuana

regulations of the marijuana industry are discussed in depth inMIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra
note 1, at 443-78.
63 As of August 1, 2019, Colorado alone had licensed 571 retail marijuana shops and 454
medical marijuana shops. See COLO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,
MED Resources and Statistics, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/medresources-and-statistics (last visited Aug. 03, 2019).
64 See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE
WESTERN RES. L. REV. 597 (2015) (providing an insightful and comprehensive analysis of
federal regulations that now limit the marijuana industry's access to banking services).
65
Id. at 617.
66 See Benjamin M. Leff, Tax Planningfor Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523
(2014).
67 Id
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suppliers) from making those deductions." As a result, a business that sells
marijuana is now subject to a much higher effective federal tax rate than a
business that sells, say, alcohol or tobacco products."
As a final example of the way that federal law continues to hound state
licensed marijuana businesses under the Partial Truce, consider that
marijuana suppliers also remain vulnerable to private civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) lawsuits.7 0 Every statelicensed marijuana business likely violates the federal RICO statute. 7 ' To be
sure, those businesses do not have to worry about being prosecuted
criminally for these violations; after all, the DOJ's non-enforcement policy
discussed earlier applies as much to these RICO offenses as it does to the
marijuana trafficking offenses that the businesses are committing. But unlike
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the federal RICO statute can also be
enforced by private plaintiffs. 7 2 In particular, the RICO statute empowers
anyone who has suffered an injury to their "business or property" by
racketeering activity (here, growing or selling marijuana) to bring a civil
cause of action against the perpetrator.73 What is more, the RICO statute
promises treble damages to victorious plaintiffs. 74
Critically, private
plaintiffs are not bound by DOJ prosecutorial decisions or congressional
spending riders. In other words, private plaintiffs can sue marijuana
dispensaries even if the DOJ declines to bring (or is forbidden by Congress
from bringing) a criminal prosecution against them.7'
In fact, private

68 26 U.S.C. §280E ("No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or
incurred during that taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or
business ... consists of trafficking in controlled substances ... which is prohibited by Federal
law . . ").
69 For discussions of Section 280E and its impact on the state-licensed marijuana industry,
see Leff, Tax Planningfor MarijuanaDealers, supra note 66 (discussing impact of Section
280E and possible workarounds); Robert A. Mikos, The Corporate Tax Cut Might Have Done
More for MarijuanaSuppliers than Repealing Section 280E Would Have, MARIJUANA LAW,

POLICY,

AND

AUTHORITY

BLOG

(Feb.

16,

2018),

.

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/201 8/02/the-corporate-tax-cut-might-have-donemore-for-marijuana-suppliers-than-repealing-section-280e-would-have/ (demonstrating that
recent federal tax cuts have mitigated the impact of Section 280E).
'0 Mikos, A CriticalAppraisal, supra note 52, at 649.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2016). See also Mikos, A CriticalAppraisal, supra note 52, at 64951 (explaining how marijuana suppliers almost invariably violate the RICO statute).
72 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation . .. of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. .
73 Id.
74 Id.
7
E.g., Robert A. Mikos, Federal Appeals Court Allows Private Civil RICO Suit to
ProceedAgainstState-LicensedMarijuanaGrower (Safe Streets), MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY,
AND
AUTHORITY
BLOG
(July
25,
2017),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/20 17/07/federal-appeals-court-allows-private-civilrico-to-proceed-against-state-licensed-marijuana-grower-safe-streets/.
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plaintiffs have already filed several prominent civil RICO lawsuits against
state-licensed marijuana suppliers, seeking large damages.16 While these
suits have not been very successful to date," the allure of treble damages
likely ensures that these private lawsuits will continue until Congress
legalizes the industry's activities or immunizes the industry from RICO
lawsuits.
These are just a few of the challenges that the federal marijuana ban
continues to pose for the state licensed marijuana industry, notwithstanding
the Partial Truce called by the Obama Administration. While these (and
other") challenges have not quashed the marijuana industry, they do add to
the industry's cost of doing business. For example, the lack of access to
banking means that marijuana suppliers must conduct most of their
transactions (e.g., paying employees) in cash, and handling that cash cuts into
the industry's bottom line." Furthermore, the federal challenges arguably
undermine state regulations. For example, because they leave no paper trail,
cash transactions are much more difficult to monitor than would be electronic
transactions (e.g., credit card payments)."o As a result, regulators may
struggle to verify a marijuana supplier's compliance with state tax collection
requirements.
THE THIRD PHASE: LEAERSHIP OR CAPITULATION?

The current regulatory quagmire is less than ideal for the states, the parties
they regulate, the federal government, and those who either support or oppose
legalization. Because of dissatisfaction with the status quo, pressure is
mounting to change federal marijuana policy-but what does the future hold?
How will the federal government respond to state reforms going forward?

76 Mikos, FederalAppealsCourtAllows Private CivilRICO Suitto ProceedAgainstStateLicensed MarijuanaGrower (Safe Streets), supra note 75.
7 Robert A. Mikos, Court Dismisses Civil RICO Suit Against Marijuana Supplier, Tees
Up PotentialCircuitSplit, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY BLOG (Aug. 27, 2018),

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/08/court-dismisses-civil-rico-suit-againstmarijuana-supplier-tees-up-potential-circuit-split/; e.g., Robert A. Mikos, UPDATE: Plaintiff
Loses Colorado RICO Lawsuit (Safe Streets), MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY
BLOG (Nov. 1, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/11/update-plaintiff-loses-

colorado-rico-lawsuit-safe-streets/.
7 For discussions of some of the other obstacles posed by the federal marijuana ban, see,
e.g., MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, supra note 1, at 407-09 (discussing the bar on federal

trademark registration); Robert A. Mikos, PharmaCann v. BV Development: Another Land
Use Issue Confronts Marijuana Suppliers, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY BLOG
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/03/pharnacann-v-bv-

development-another-land-use-issue-confronts-marijuana-suppliers/

(restrictive covenants);

Luke Scheuer, Are "Legal" Marijuana Contracts "Illegal"?, 16 U.C.
(2015) (contract enforcement).
79 Hill, Banks, Marijuana,and Federalism,supra note 64, at 597.
80 Id.
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Congress has already taken a limited step toward reforming federal
marijuana policy. The 2018 Farm Bill exempted "hemp" and "hemp"
derived products-including, most notably, CBD-from the federal CSA.8
Under the Farm Bill, hemp is defined as cannabis containing less than .3%
(by dry weight) THC.82 Previously, the CSA defined "marijuana" to include
all cannabis (except stalks and non-germinating seeds), regardless of its
THC content-making most hemp legally indistinguishable from
recreational strains, like Purple Haze or Sour Diesel.83 Now that hemp is no
longer a controlled substance under the federal CSA, the hemp industry is
booming and products made from hemp, including various CBD products,
are becoming ubiquitous."
Foretelling the future and what the federal government might do next
necessarily involves some speculation. I will briefly outline two possible
scenarios for the future of federal marijuana policy. The first (and less likely)
scenario involves the federal government assuming a more pro-active
leadership role in marijuana policy, one in which it would wield greater
influence over marijuana activities. Although I think it worth considering, I
am skeptical that this Leadership Scenario will materialize for a simple
reason: Congress will struggle to reach consensus around any substantive
marijuana policy that seeks to re-invigorate or replace the current prohibition.
On the one hand, it is almost inconceivable that the federal government
would attempt to assume leadership in this field by restarting its "War on
Marijuana." The public has grown increasingly favorable toward outright
marijuana legalization over the last two decades. Indeed, the latest opinion
polls estimate that roughly 66% of Americans favor legalization of adult use
of marijuana (even higher numbers support medical legalization)." Given
the popularity of legalization, Congress is highly unlikely to devote the
resources that would be needed to mount an effective campaign against legal
marijuana, or even to lift the restrictions it has imposed on the use of existing
enforcement resources (through the spending riders noted earlier). 8 It is
simply too late to put the proverbial cat back in the bag.
On the other hand, I also suspect that Congress will be reluctant to play a
more active role in regulating legal marijuana. One major reason is that
legalization states would resist any push to federalize key aspects of
marijuana policy. After all, many states benefit from the current state-driven
marijuana policy-it allows them to impose rules that favor local interests

1

Mikos, New CongressionalFarm Bill, supra note 8.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84 Id.
85

See McCarthy, Two in ThreeAmericans Now SupportLegalizingMarijuana,supranote

15.
86 See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 20, at 1463-65, 1469 (discussing

the level of additional resources that would be required to effectively combat marijuana
activities without state assistance).

16

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 26:1

over outside interests." These states might lose out on tax revenues and jobs
if the market for marijuana became more national in scope-a likely outcome
if Congress were at the helm of marijuana policy.
To be sure, some federal agencies may seek to play a prominent role in
the regulation of legal marijuana. For example, citing its authority under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
is considering new federal rules to govern the inter-state sale of food products
containing hemp-derived CBD." But outside of such limited pockets of
federal influence, I suspect that most features of marijuana policy will
continue to be set primarily by the states, rather than by the federal
government.
The dim prospects for federal leadership in this field are unfortunate.
Whatever one might think of our current federal marijuana policy, there is a
very strong normative argument to be made for federal control of this drug."
Marijuana activities generate significant interstate spillover effects (e.g.,
think of cross-border smuggling), and states have little incentive to address
these spillovers.o There are also substantial advantages to coordinating
marijuana policies (e.g., labeling laws), and that coordination can best be
achieved by the federal government." Furthermore, public opinion has
converged on the most important issues surrounding marijuana policy,
suggesting that there is little to be gained from allowing states to apply their
own, idiosyncratic rules to marijuana activities.92 Despite the strong
normative case for federal leadership, however, I doubt that Congress or any
federal agency will be able to take charge of marijuana policy anytime soon
(if ever).
This leaves a second, more likely scenario for future federal marijuana
policy, one I call "Capitulation." Capitulation simply means that the federal
government would cede even more control of marijuana policy to the states.
In other words, it would remove federal obstacles to marijuana activities and
give the states even wider latitude to regulate marijuana as they deem fit.
(Under the Leadership Scenario, by contrast, the federal government would
set some rules or at least meaningfully limit state discretionary authority.)

" See BrannonP. Denning, One Toke Over the (State) Line: Constitutional Limits on 'Pot
Tourism'Restrictions,66 FLA. L. REV. 2279 (2012).
1 See Tal Axelrod, FDA holds itsfirst hearing on regulating CBD, THE HLL (May 31,

2019), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/446450-fda-holds-its-first-hearing-on-regulatingcbd. For an excellent analysis of the FDA's authority to regulate marijuana products, see Sean
M. O'Connor & Erika Lietzan, The SurprisingReach ofFDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even
after Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019).
89 See Robert A. Mikos, Why the Federal Government Should Set MarijuanaPolicy, in
DEBATING REFORM: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON How To FIX THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

SYSTEM 50-56 (Richard Ellis & Mike Nelson, eds., 4th ed. CQ Press, forthcoming 2020)
[hereinafter Mikos, Why the Federal Government Should Set MarijuanaPolicy].
90 Id.
91 Mikos, Why the FederalGovernment Should Set MarijuanaPolicy, supra note 89.
92 Id.
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Capitulation could follow either of two paths. First, it might proceed
incrementally, through the adoption of piecemeal legislation that removes,
one-by-one, the federal legal obstacles that now bedevil the state-licensed
marijuana industry. The Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act93
is an illustrative example of such incremental capitulatory legislation. The
SAFE Banking Act would bar federal financial regulators from penalizing
banks that serve state-licensed marijuana businesses. 4 The Act would thus
make it considerably easier for those businesses to secure basic banking
services, like checking accounts and lines of credit.9' In similar fashion,
other proposed legislation would target other, discrete problems now caused
by the federal marijuana ban. 96
Second, Capitulation could also proceed more swiftly, through passage of
more comprehensive federal reform legislation. The Strengthening the Tenth
Amendment Through Entrusting States (STATES) Act is perhaps the leading
example of such legislation.97 The STATES Act would empower states to
opt-out of the federal CSA's ban on marijuana. Namely, if a state authorized
an activity, such as the distribution of marijuana to adults, the federal CSA
would no longer ban that activity." Because their activities would no longer
be federally unlawful, state-licensed-marijuana businesses could obtain
banking services, deduct operating expenses when calculating their federal
tax liabilities, and so on.99 Put another way, the STATES Act would
eliminate all of the legal obstacles that now flow from the federal marijuana
ban (or at least, those obstacles posed by the CSA in states that legalize the
drug).oo

93 SAFE Banking Act of 2019 (H.R. 1595), https://www.congress.gov/bill/I16thcongress/housebill/1595/text?q=%7B%22search/o22%3A%5B%22safe+banking+acto22%5D%7D&r=2&
s=1.
94 Id.
95 Robert A. Mikos, Federal MarijuanaBanking Bill Advances (a Little), MARIJUANA
LAW,

POLICY,

AND

AUTHORITY

BLOG

(Mar.

30,

2019),

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2019/03/federal-marijuana-banking-bill-advances-alittle/ (analyzing likely effects of SAFE Banking Act).
96 E.g., Veterans Medical Marijuana Safe Harbor Act, S.3409, 115th Cong. § 3(a)(2)
(2017-2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 15th-congress/senate-bill/3409/text?format=txt
(allowing, inter alia, Veterans Administration physicians to recommend marijuana to patients,
where authorized by state law).
97 Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S.1028, 116th
https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 16th-congress/senateCong.
(2019-2020),
bill/1028?q=%7B%22search%/o22%3A%5B%22strengthening+the+tenth+amendment%22%
5D%7D&s=6&r=1.
98 Robert A. Mikos, Analysis of the Warren-GardnerSTATES Act, MARIJUANA LAW,
POLICY,

AND

AUTHORITY

BLOG

(June

7,

2018),

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/06/analysis-of-the-warren-gardner-states-act/.
99 Id.
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The Marijuana Justice Act (MJA) is another example of comprehensive
capitulatory legislation.'
Proposed by Senator Cory Booker, the MJA
would de-schedule marijuana, making the CSA inapplicable to the drug
regardless of the content of state law. 02 In other words, marijuana would be
legal under federal law regardless of how state law treated the drug. But
apart from repealing federal prohibition in all states or just some of them,
neither the MJA nor the STATES Act envision much of a federal role in
regulating legal marijuana' 03-hence the "Capitulation" moniker appears apt
for both of them.
Although incremental and comprehensive federal reforms have both
garnered some bi-partisan support, I think that Congress is more likely to
pursue the incremental approach. For one thing, it is easier for a legislature
to build consensus behind a narrow, targeted measure like the SAFE Banking
Act. Indeed, the SAFE Banking Act has already sailed through one key
House Committee.1o' Furthermore, the passage of incremental legislation
will likely reduce the pressure on Congress to adopt bolder, more
comprehensive reforms.
CONCLUSION

While federal marijuana law appears quite static in comparison to the
marijuana laws of the states, we are witnessing a gradual evolution in the
federal response to state reforms. The federal government has already called
a Partial Truce in its long-time War on marijuana legalization. For the most
part, this evolution in federal policy has been driven by changes in the way
that the federal government enforces its laws, rather than changes in the
substance of those laws. Although this Partial Truce has enabled states to
pursue some regulatory reforms, federal law continues to pose obstacles for
the marijuana industry. Mounting dissatisfaction with the Partial Truce is
likely to spur further changes to federal marijuana policy. The next chapter
is yet to be written, but signs portend some form of federal capitulation. In
other words, the federal government is likely to cede even more control to
the states, enabling them (for better or worse) to pursue their own,
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102 Marijuana Justice Act of 2019, supra note 101.
103 See Mikos, Analysis of the Warren-GardnerSTATES Act, supra note 98; Robert A.
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